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FAMILY LAW 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
As before, family law provided more than its share of legal curios this 
year. Of more substantial importance were the decisions supporting Mexican 
divorces against jurisdictional attack, suggesting that separation agreements, 
though valid, could be adjusted to provide greater payments to the wife if 
she was in danger of becoming a public charge, and allowing modification 
of child support payments when the only changed circumstance was the fact 
that the mother was no longer faced with the necessity of working out other 
financial arrangements with her husband. In addition, the New York State 
Legislature enacted a number of bills which affected familial economics and 
an intriguing dictum raised the possibility of using arbitration as means of 
settling child custody disputes. 
I 
MARITAL DISSOLUTION 
Divorce.-The most important cases of the year were the reversals of 
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel and Wood v. Wood.1 By its reversals, the Court of 
Appeals indicated that Mexican divorces would be recognized, at least under 
some circumstances, despite the absence of an extended Mexican residence or 
domicile requirement.2 The decisions drew acid editorial comment through­
out the state, not directed to themselves, but to divorce law which now pro­
vides a safe speedy alternative to the New York adultery divorce for those 
who can afford Mexican proceedings. 
Despite the basic approval of Mexican divorces, the Court of Appeals 
has left unanswered many questions concerning laches and estoppel.s On 
the basis of prior law,4 one had reason to hope that these doctrines would at 
some point bar a spouse, "divorced" by a foreign decree, from litigating the 
validity of that decree. To allow the "spouse" knowingly to sit back while 
remarriage occurs and a new family is created and to retain indefinitely the 
power to terminate the second marriage by a declaration of invalidity seems 
George J. Alexander is Associate Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College 
of Law and a Member of the New York and Illinois Bars. 
1. 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965). 
2. Actually, the decisions skirt making definitive pronouncements on many of the 
outstanding issues concerning the validity of Mexican divorces. See Herzog. ConBict of 
Laws, 1965 Survey of N.Y. Law, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 139 (1965). 
3. See id. at 143. 
4. Weiner v. Weiner, 13 App. Div. 2d 937, 216 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1st Dep't 1961): d. 
Christensen v. Christensen, 39 Misc. 2d 370, 240 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963). 
It may be that Mexican "mail· order " divorces are handled differently. See Boardman, 
New York Family Law 984 (1964). Whether such differences as exist are sufficiently 
pervasive to determine essentially economic interests is another matter. Querze v. Querze, 
290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943). 
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harsh. Nonetheless a "Westchester surrogate, in Matter of Estate of Liebman/' 
permitted the issue of invalidity to be raised twenty-nine years after the 
Mexican divorce was obtained and a remarriage occurred. Finding the 
divorce faulty, the surrogate ruled that the first wife, and not the "wife" of 
twenty-nine years of marriage, was entitled to letters of administration of the 
husband's estate. 
Decisions in intrastate divorce law added to an already long list of 
grotesque examples of where the single-ground law can lead. The Court of 
Appeals held that evidence of adultery obtained by a raiding party was 
,'alidly admitted.6 Fifteen days later the Appellate Division, Third Depart­
ment, seemed to suggest yet another use for raiding parties in Tallent v. 
TallcJlt.7 According to Mrs. Tallent, Mr. Tallent, during the interlocutory 
petiod of his divorce, had intercourse with her on eight different occasions. 
The court denied her motion to vacate the interlocutory judgment of divorce 
on the grounds that her testimony as to condonation was incompetent by 
virtue of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 4502. This 
section literally allows disproof of the defenses to adultery, but does not men­
tion proof of the defenses in specifying items to which the parties can testify. 
Actually, Mrs. Tallent did not come completely unprepared to these pro­
(eedings. She presented an affidavit from an affiant who had been stationed 
on the fire escape and who was prepared to testify as to what transpired be­
tween the parties. The court refused to consider the affidavit because it 
"stated merely that she [the affiant] was in a position to observe but omitted 
any evidence whatever of her observation."8 
The public policy against contracting with a spouse to obtain a divorce9 
has always presented some problems in application. "While it has been clear 
that one could not expressly condition benefits on the obtaining of a divorce. 
a fault still to be found in some separation agreements,lO the courts have ap­
parently blinked at the obvious fact that a separation agreement must, in 
most cases, be written around an understanding as to the terms under which 
the marital status is to be changed. Viles v. Viles,11 approved this year by the 
Court of Appeals,12 seems to leave parties in a somewhat greater quandary 
5. 44 Misc. 2d 191, 253 N.Y.S.2d 461 (SUIT. Ct., Westch. Co. 1963). 
6. Sadder v. Sadder, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964). 
7. 22 App. Div. 2d 988, 254 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't 1964). 
8. Id. at 989, 254 N.y.s.2d at 724. 
9. N.Y. Gen. Ob. Law § 5-311. 
10. Fisher v. Fisher, 43 Misc. 2d 905,252 N.y.s.2d 643 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964). The 
agreement in this case provided that: "'In the event that the parties hereto are stm 
united in the bonds of matrimony on the 1st day of March, 1963 then it is mutually agreed 
that all the terms, covenants and agreements herein contained shall cease to be binding 
upon either of the parties for any purpose . . . •  ' " Id. at 906, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
11. See Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369 373. 
n.32 (1963) and accompanying text for a discussion of the case. ' 
12. 14 N.Y.2d 365, 200 N.E.2d 567, 251 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1964). 
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than they previously faced by its invalidation of an agreement because of its 
unrecorded connection with divorce plans. 
A more candid appraisal of the workings of dissolution proceedings 
seems implicit in the decision in Herzog v. Herzog,13 where a court granted 
an interlocutory decree of divorce on motion of the defendant after the 
plaintiff wife, having won her case, refused to enter a decree. The court rea­
soned that since the parties had agreed to a financial settlement and the hus­
band had thereafter withdrawn his defense, she could not then prevent his 
obtaining the benefits of the arrangement-a divorce. Another court felt 
called upon to tell a plaintiff, this time one who had proceeded a bit further 
in the procedure, that she could not take back her decree during the inter­
locutory period because she suddenly discovered it to be to her financial ad­
vantage not to have obtained the interlocutory decree.14 
As yet unclear is the extent to which Mr. Justice Harlan is correct in 
Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank15 when he suggests that the United 
States Supreme Court is now revising the divisible divorce doctrine. 
Annulment.-Annulment has, of course, always been a viable alterna­
tive to divorce in this state.16 Of the grounds for annulment, "fraud" presents 
the most appealing, apparently because no one seems sure of what it means. 
The Appellate Division, First Department, this year again recited as a con­
trolling test the quotation from Schoenfeld v. Schoenfeld:17 " 'The court is 
left free to meet each case as it arises and to apply to the defendant's conduct 
the immemorial test of fair and conscientious dealing.' "18 Such a suggestion 
of an almost ad hoc approach to decisions in the annulment cases, coupled 
with the still significant quantum of litigation, must be a source of encour­
agement to plaintiffs with minimal complaints. Take, for example, the com­
plaint of Emma Pankiw19 who sought annulment in 1964 of a marriage 
which dated from 1949 on the grounds that her husband had not revealed 
his premarital paternity of an illegitimate child and that he had misrep­
resented his age by two years. Since, absent any representation to the con­
trary, courts have not considered it an obligation of a marital partner to 
disclose fully his premarital sexual exploits20 and since the paternity issue 
did not relate to any postmarital difficulty, the fraud ground really stood or 
fell on the misrepresentation of his age. Not surprisingly, it fell. On the other 
hand, the first department, employing the test of fair and conscientious deal­
ing, found that a representation by a husband that he was born in Germany, 
13. 46 Misc. 2d 362, 259 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1965). 
14. Gilstein v. Gilstein, 23 App. Div. 2d 678, 257 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1965). 
15. 381 U.S. 81 (1965). See note 73 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See Note, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1941). 
17. 260 N.Y. 477, 184 N.E. 60 (1933). 
18. Sophian v. Von Linde, 22 App. Div. 2d 34, 36, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (1st Dep't 
1964). 
19. Pankiw v. Pankiw, 45 Misc. 2d 206, 256 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co. 1965). 
20. Glean v. Glean, 70 App. Div. 576, 75 N.Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dep't 1902). 
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a member of the nobility and a Graf (count), when false, was sufficiently 
fraudulent to allow the aunt of a deceased wife an annulment on the wife's 
behalf.:!l Yet the same department, in Kober v. Kober,22 only four months 
later, denied an annulment where the husband had allegedly concealed his 
German ancestry and had also concealed that he had been an officer in the 
Gelman army and a member of the Nazi party, that he was at the time of 
marriage and at the time of complaint a strong anti-Semite, that he believed 
that the solution to the Jewish problem was the "Final Solution" of the 
Jewish question, namely, the extermination of the Jewish people, and that 
he would require his wife to terminate her friendship with Jews. 
Separations.-Even separations are not necessarily easy to obtain. For 
example, one justice, in ruling against a separation, stated: 
The plaintiff admitted that at various times she spat on defendant, that since 
December, 1963, she has refused to have sexual relations with him and has told 
him to go and get another woman, that prior to the incident in which defendant 
held her head under the bathtub faucet she had thrown a pot of water on him 
and that prior to the incident in which he tied her hands and feet, he had sought 
to make love to her and she had repulsed him, slapping and kicking him.23 
Since this is an almost perfect case illustrating the defense of recrimination, 
the result is not novel. 
II 
CHILDREN 
A nagging problem has been the right of a mother to the return of her 
child from an agency with which the child may have been placed.24 The crux 
of the problem lies in the length of time required to terminate permanently 
a parental right to custody.25 It seems clear that strong public policy suggests 
leaving an avenue open by which parental custody can be reestablished. 
Apparently, it is only in the service of that end that the parents' interests are 
to be given controlling weight. In People ex rei. Anonymous v. Talbott 
Pcrkings Adoption Serv.,26 a mother who sought custody of her child in De­
cember following a September surrender to the commissioner of welfare was 
denied her child because her purpose was to accomplish a private placement 
adoption and not to take custody herself. 
It has long been established that the parents of a child may agree on his 
religious upbringing while they continue to live together or as an incident to 
21. Sophian v. Von Linde, 22 App. Div. 2d 34, 253 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1st Dep't 1964). 
22. 22 App. Div. 2d 468, 256 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1st Dep't 1965). Subsequent to the writing 
of this article the decision of the appellate division was reversed in 16 N.Y.2d 191, 211 
N.E.2d 817, 264 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1965). 
23. Becker v. Becker, 46 Misc. 2d 858, 859, 260 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 
1965). 
24. See Alexander, supra note 11, at 377-78. 
25. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 611 (supstantia1 abandonment for more than one year); cf. 
N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law §§ 111-12. 
26. 46 Misc. 2d 369, 259 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1965). 
HeinOnline -- 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 322 1965-1966
322 SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW 
an agreement to separate.27 Such an agreement, however, does not interfere 
with a court's power to redetermine the issue in the best interests of the 
child. When the child is mature enough to have his wishes considered, they 
may be found to override his parents' agreement.28 Where the parties have 
not reached an agreement on the religious upbringing of the child, courts 
have been careful to avoid decreeing the form of religious training the child 
is to obtain.29 Since the courts will not direct that the child be raised in a 
religion different from that of the custodial parent, the result may be to 
change the child's religion.30 The court may, however, require that the non­
custodial parent be given an opportunity to have the child trained reli­
giously during his visitations or during a period of temporary custody,31 and 
failure of the custodial parent to allow such religious training can be 
punished by contempt.32 The question of the importance of an agreement 
between the parties in cases where children were too young to advise the 
court of the appropriate disposition has remained unresolved. In O'Neill v. 
O'Neill,33 the court allowed a child formerly raised in a Catholic home to be 
brought up by the custodial mother in the Jewish faith, despite her having 
executed a written undertaking that any children of the marriage would be 
raised in the Roman Catholic religion and despite the child's baptism as a 
Roman Catholic. The court noted: 
As a mother has and will have custody of the child, it would lead to great conflict 
and probable injury to the child's psychological well·being to attempt to compel 
the mother to raise the child against the mother's will in a religion that is 
different from the religion of the mother's home and it would represent for the 
child a sharp compulsory break from the religion with which she now feels herself 
to be affiliated and which she knows is the religion in which her mother wishes to 
raise her.34 
Several courts this year concluded that while they were under no obliga­
tion to enforce foreign custody decrees, they were inclined to accept them by 
comity where the decrees did not seem injurious to the best interest of the 
child. At a minimum, there was no need to redetermine custody provisions 
de novo when a determination had been made by a foreign court.35 Beyond 
27. Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N.Y. 294, 183 N.E. 492 (1932). 
28. Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954). 
29. People ex reI. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936). "The court cannot 
regulate by its process the internal affairs of the home. Dispute between parents when it 
does not involve anything immoral or harmful to the welfare of the child is beyond the 
reach of the law." Id. at 287,2 N.E.2d at 661. Thus it is normally improper to change the 
custody of children solely to effect a change in religious training. 
30. Paolella v. Phillips, 27 Mise. 2d 763, 209 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1960); 
cf. Seltzer v. Wendell, 11 App. Div. 2d 805, 205 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1960). 
31. Seltzer v. Wendell, supra note 30. 
32. Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,31 Mise. 2d 58, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1961). 
33. 45 Mise. 2d 1,255 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965). 
34. Id. at 4, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 779. 
35. Sloane v. Sloane, 15 N.Y.2d 561, 203 N.E.2d 217, 254 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1964). For a 
discussion of the case see Alexander, Family Law, 1964 Survey of N.Y. Law, 16 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 402, 416 (1964). 
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that, the agreement of the parents may be accepted as an appropriate 
basis for disposition where circumstances have remained substantially un­
changed.36 To say that the parties may by agreement or as a result of litiga­
tion in an out-of-state court relieve the courts of the necessity of making a 
de novo inquiry does not suggest that custodial questions can be summarily 
handled by trial courts, absent such an agreement or judgment, without a 
hearing.37 Since the focus of the inquiry is on the best interests of the child, 
and not of his parents, the fact that one of the litigants is a parent and the 
other is not, need not be determinative.3s On the other hand, parental rights 
are strong enough, in most cases, to require an inquiry into their termina­
tion before the ties are judicially declared cut. Consequently, a first husband 
must be given a hearing on the issue of abandonment before an adoption of 
his child by a second husband can be approved without his consent.39 
The involvement of courts in an attempt to find other means of effectu­
ating the best interest of children led to three rather remarkable cases this 
year. In the Matter of S,40 a family court judge, apparently sharing the frus­
tration of some of his brethren concerning the inability to establish a child 
battering case, decided that a case would be sufficiently made out by the pro­
duction of a young child bearing evidence of physical abuse absent a satis­
factory explanation as to his condition. According to the judge, he had bor­
rowed the res ipsa loquitur principle. 'While one can sympathize with the 
court's motive, it seems doubtful that the situation is far different from crim­
inal proceedings in which it would be equally expeditious to make a defen­
dant exculpate himself. 
In ;.lfatter of Higgins,41 a family court judge was faced with a demand 
by Michigan authorities that she sign a guarantee against the child's becom­
ing a public charge in Michigan in order to validate a private arrangement 
that had been made for the child with his maternal aunt in Michigan upon 
the death of the child's mother. The easy solution for the judge would have 
been to hold, as she did, that she lacked statutory authority to enter any 
such agreement. Noting, however, that it is "poor laws" of the kind which 
here required a guarantee that make satisfactory placement of children out­
side of the state difficult, Judge PoIier, in a carefully worded opinion, held 
additionally that the Michigan statute contravened the United States Con­
stitution. Although one may doubt that there will be an immediate response 
to the court's opinion by the Michigan Legislature it can be hoped that the 
36. Foussier v. Uzielli, 23 App. Div. 2d 260, 260 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1st Dep't 1965); Abreu 
v. Abreu, 45 Misc. 2d 952, 261 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Family Ct., Ulster Co. 1965). 
37. People ex rel. Jackson v. Mitchell, 22 App. Div. 2d 903, 255 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d 
Dep't 1965); People ex reI. Putziger, 22 App. Div. 2d 821, 254 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1964). 
38. People ex reI. Conti v. Molinari, 23 App. Div. 2d 893, 260 N.Y.S.2d 551 (2d Dep't 
1965). 
39. Matter of Favro, 44 Misc. 2d 464, 254 N.y.s.2d 278 (Family Ct., Steuben Co. 1964). 
40. 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct., Kings Co. 1965). 
41. 46 Mise. 2d 233, 259 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1965). ' , 
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opinion will make agencies concerned with child placement more reluctant 
to accept at face value state poor laws as a bar to child placement. 
The most curious decision of the group is Matter of Anonymous.42 In 
that case, a child had been placed, upon discharge from the hospital after its 
birth, in the home of adoptive parents by an attorney apparently acting as 
an intermediary between them and the mother. An action for adoption was 
brought when the child was fourteen. Since there was apparently no objec­
tion as to the adoptive parents, only two issues remained in the way of a 
judicial approval of the adoption. The first was that the natural mother of 
the child was Protestant while the adoptive parents were Jewish. The second 
was that the child had been placed by the attorney in apparent contraven­
tion of Social "\Velfare Law Section 374. Under section 389 of the same act, 
the attorney might be subject to misdemeanor prosecution. 
The religious problem did not cause the judge great difficulty. He read 
Matter of Maxwell43 as allowing sufficient discretion to approve this adop­
tion, in light of the natural mother's consent that her child be raised as a 
Jew. This conclusion raises again the meaning of the religious matching re­
quirement44 which controls the placement of children. It is not too clear by 
what standard one judges the religious faith of a newborn child, although 
that appears to be the controlling focus. However one answers that question, 
it would seem to relate to an objective fact, not to a maternal right which 
the mother is capable of altering by contract. Matter of Maxwell could well 
be read as limited to circumstances in which the natural mother lied about 
her religion and the adoptive parents relied on her statement, a situation 
which would be inapplicable in the instant case.45 Since it is easy to have 
grave reservations about the desirability of forced religious matching both 
from the standpoint of church·state separation46 and its utility in proper 
child placement,47 one may hope that the instant extension of the Maxwell 
case finds judicial favor. 
The other issues sufficiently troubled the judge so that he ultimately 
denied the adoption. Although the relevant sections of the Social Welfare 
Law may well support the judge's conclusion that the placing out by an 
attorney is unlawful, the conclusion that a child unlawfully placed out can­
not be adopted seems curious indeed. The apparent reason for these provi-
42. 46 Misc. 2d 928, 261 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Family Ct., Dutchess Co. 1965). 
43. 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). 
44. See Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceed· 
ings, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 649 (1959). 
45. In any event, the later amendment of the religious matching requirement, Family 
Ct. Act § 116(e), so as to restrictively define "when practicable," the words relied upon by 
the Maxwell majority, seems to make even the Maxwell holding questionable. 
46. Ramsey, supra note 44, at 680-84. 
47. It is interesting to contrast the mandatory religious matching provisions with the 
suggestion that racial considerations may not even be considered. See Rockefeller v. 
Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962), discussed in 
Alexander, supra note 11, at 378. 
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sions of the Social Welfare Law was a legislative concern for black market 
babies.48 One may doubt the judge's assertion, made on the basis of these 
sections, that the Legislature has declared a public policy "prohibiting adop­
tions which begin improperly."49 Equally curious is what appears to be the 
major rationale for the decision. "The motivation and professional approach 
which welfare departments and authorized adoption agencies can give can­
not be substituted for [sic] one unskilled in social work no matter how 
benevolent his motives in investigating and evaluating the material elements 
of an adoption proceeding and placing a child in a family unit."50 Such an 
argument might well explain the result in a state where placement is a state 
monopoly, but it is hard to follow in New York where private placement 
adoption is a legislatively established alternative to the placement by au­
thorized agencies.lil It seems clear that the mother could have directly placed 
the child,52 and it is apparently accepted by the court that the foster parents 
were appropriate adoptive parents. "Why Judge Jiudice felt compelled to 
punish the child and the adoptive parents as a means of implementing the 
misdemeanor provisions of the Social 'Welfare Law is unclear. 
Of greatest importance in this area is the dictum of the appellate divi­
sion in Sheets v. Sheets,53 in which the court went to considerable lengths to 
endorse the legitimacy of a provision for arbitration of disputed custody 
questions in private agreements. Apparently, between the parents, arbitra­
tion may provide a final answer to disputes should the parents choose to 
include an appropriate provision in their separation agreement. Of course, 
the court reserves the right to override their wishes in the interest of the 
child.54 
III 
PATERNITY AND ILLEGITIMACY 
The question of whether a married woman may bring a suit for pater­
nity of her child in light of the rewording of the definition of "child born out 
48. See People v. Scopas, 11 N.Y.2d 120, 181 N.E.2d 754, 227 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1962) 
(dissenting opinion). 
49. Matter of Anonymous, supra note 42, at 930, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 442. 
50. Ibid. 
51. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law §§ 115·16. 
52. N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 374(2). 
53. 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1964). 
54. The court adds: 
[S]ubmission of disputes in custody and visitation matters to voluntary arbitration 
need no longer receive general interdiction, and such procedures should be 
encouraged as a sound and practical method for resolving such disputes. But as 
indicated hereinabove, arbitration awards which may adversely affect the best 
interests of the child will be disregarded by the courts whose paternal jurisdiction 
is paramount. As a consequence, there may in certain instances be a duplication 
of effort, where the court decides to look into the matter de novo and reaches 
the same or different result. 
Id. at 179·80,254 N.Y.S.2d at 325. 
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of wedlock" is still being litigated.55 The ever increasing consensus appears 
to be that, under appropriate circumstances, she may.56 
A number of procedural matters were also clarified. Section 517(b) of 
the Family Court Act is an obvious attempt to preserve the State's interest 
in having children supported by their parents. This section provides that the 
commissioner of welfare may bring an action for paternity within a period 
of ten years after the birth of the child, although the mother is only per­
mitted two years for such action in most circumstances. Reading this intent 
into the unqualified language of the statute, a court this year conditioned 
the exercise of the commissioner's right on a demonstration that the mother 
would likely become a recipient of welfare payments.57 It remained clear, 
however, that paternity orders protect the child's interest in support as well 
as relieving the State's concern that it might otherwise shoulder the burden. 
Thus, orders could properly issue commanding fathers to support children 
who were out of state.58 
A new provision of the Decedent Estate Law, Section 83-a, fills a iong 
felt need for greater inheritance rights for illegitimate children.59 The 
statute provides, broadly, that for purposes of intestate succession an illegiti­
mate child shall inherit from and through his mother and from his father 
if an order of paternity has issued against him. In tum, those from whom the 
illegitimate child is entitled to distribution, inherit from him. What appears 
to be most controversial in this new statute is provision (l )(c) which bars 
inheritance from the father on the basis of an agreement or compromise of 
the paternity question short of an order of filiation. This section would seem 
to provide at least one reason for the bringing of some paternity actions that 
might otherwise be settled. If, in practice, it will have that result, one may 
regard this qualification as unfortunate. 
IV 
FAMILY ECONOMICS 
The question of the title to marital property, always a thorny problem,60 
has not been made easier by the passage of Domestic Relations Law Section 
55. For prior installments of the dispute see Alexander, supra note 35, at 412. 
56. Fitzsimmons v. De Cicco, 44 Mise. 2d 307, 253 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Family Ct., Ulster 
Co. 1964); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 43 Misc. 2d 1050, 252 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Family Ct., 
Albany Co. 1964). 
57. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 44 Misc. 2d 770, 254 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 
1964). 
58. Urbancig v. Pipitone, 23 App. Div. 2d 193, 259 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1965) (child 
in Canada); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 44 Misc. 2d 721, 255 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Family Ct., N.Y. 
Co. 1964). 
59. See Alexander, supra note 35, at 414. 
60. For a discussion of recent problems concerning jointly held property, see Alex­
ander, supra note 11, at 369-70. 
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23-1.61 Slowly, ambiguities will, no doubt, resolve themselves. One thing is 
reasonably clear. The section which allows a court in a matrimonial action 
to (1) determine questions of title to property and (2) make directions con­
ceming possession of property in the court's discretion, does not alter extant 
rules goveming the determination of title questions between spouses. Conse­
quently, general equities conceming the need for or the use of property will 
not alter vested titles.6!! If that is correct, it would seem to follow that the 
provision of section 234 allowing directions to be made in "one or more 
orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment or by both 
such order or orders and final judgment" cannot relate to questions of title 
which presumably remain immutable. That in tum suggests that the entire 
quoted section relates only to directions conceming the possession of prop­
erty as opposed to its title. So holding, Justice Coleman, in Roth v. Roth,63 
refused to consider the question of title on a motion subsequent to a deter­
mination in the underlying matrimonial dispute. 
As is well known, the rules goveming alimony display a bias in favor of 
the wife. For example, even excessive awards of alimony retroactively re­
duced by appeal cannot be recovered from the wife once paid.64 If the hus­
band can avoid making required payments until he obtains a dismissal of 
his wife's action, can he avoid payment? After Polizotti v. Polizotti,65 one 
would have thought so. A case this year suggests otherwise. Punishing a de­
fendant for contempt of court for failure to make temporary alimony pay­
ments prior to a dismissal of the complaint, the court66 distinguished Poli­
zotti on the basis that the contempt action there had not been concluded 
prior to the dismissal of the complaint. 'Whether the contempt would lie for 
alTearages held erroneously excessive remains to be seen. 
As usual, alimony amounts were contested and recontested. Courts, 
tiring of hearing the same parties argue change of circumstances to alter a 
previous decree, have had to be admonished to provide a hearing for the 
claimant.67 One may well doubt that a system requiring such extensive com­
mitments of judicial energy is the best means of handling the problem of the 
postmarital support of the wife. 
An altemative to litigating the level of support is, of course, a separa­
tion agreement. By making such an agreement the parties settle their own 
support arrangements and, if there is neither overreaching nor contraven-
61. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 234, at 123-28 (McKinney) 
on the sketchy legislative history. 
62. Fluhr v. Fluhr, 44 Mise. 2d 1098, 255 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. 1965). 
63. 45 Misc. 2d 150, 256 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964). 
64. Glassman v. Glassman, 41 Misc. 2d 132, 245 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 
1963). 
65. 305 N.Y. 176, III N.E.2d 869 (1953). 
66. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 44 Misc. 2d 980, 255 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964) . 
. 67. Gilbert v: Gilbert, 23 App. Div. 2d 757, 258 N.y.s.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1965); Reiss v. ReISS. 23 App. DIV. 2d 692. 257 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1965). 
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tion of public policy against contracting for a divorce, such agreements are 
upheld and prevent litigation, by either party, of the support level deter­
mined. Two decisions this year suggest important qualifications. In McMains 
v. McMains,6s the Court of Appeals determined that a separation agreement. 
otherwise valid to bar suit for an increase in support payment, will not bar 
such an increase if it is required to prevent the wife's becoming a public 
charge. In Guillermo v. Guillermo,69 interpreting a separation agreement 
that had been incorporated into a foreign decree, the court hinted at the 
possibility of another exception. The GuiIIermos had negotiated their finan­
cial arrangement and then obtained a Mexican divorce decree which in­
corporated the terms of their separation agreement. Petitioning the court 
for an alteration in support payments for the child, the wife claimed, as the 
only changed circumstance, the fact that the child's support needs could now 
be considered independently of the other complications inherent in the 
dissolution of the marriage. In effect, she argued, she had been forced to 
accept too Iow a figure for the child's support as a means of effecting the final 
settlement. The court allowed the alteration, apparently giving controlling 
weight to the fact that the payments were to be for the support of the child. 
One cannot be sure what position the court would have taken had the 
petitioner also sought modification of alimony payments for her support on 
the same basis. Presumably, it would have denied her additional request 
despite the fact that, having been conciliatory to obtain a settlement on 
other issues, she would now feel less restrained if allowed to address herself 
solely to the question of her needs. 
For spouses, the choice may be between agreeing to the terms of a sepa­
ration agreement intended to survive the divorce decree which, according 
to the reasoning of McMains, would remain controlling short of the indi­
gency of the wife, and having their agreement incorporated in the divorce 
decree, which might leave it open to modification on changed circumstances 
(although probably more than the Guillermo showing would be required to 
constitute the change). The choice has other ramifications. For example, 
while court decrees terminate on remarriage, separation agreements may 
survive remarriage.70 The Legislature, probably realizing the importance of 
alimony payments to many parties, wisely equated a de facto family relation­
ship on the wife's part with her remarriage.71 A husband obligated under the 
terms of a separation agreement which does not contain such an alternative 
68. 15 N.Y.2d 283, 206 N.E.2d 185, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1965). 
69. 43 Misc. 2d 763, 252 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964). 
70. See generally, Boardman, New York Family Law 575-76 (1964). 
71. Thus, by § 248 of the Domestic Relations Law, a court may terminate alimony 
payments when a woman habitually resides with a man other than her former husband 
and holds the new man out as her husband. This provision is, of course, not as strong as 
the mandatory requirement, in the same section, that alimony be terminated on remarriage. 
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cut off date found himself, this year, forced to support a wife who had ap­
parently established a de facto relationship with another man.72 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States, at least in Mr. Justice 
Harlan's opinion, has taken the first step toward a repudiation of Vanderbilt 
v. Vanderbilt73 which held New York entitled to enforce a separation decree's 
support obligation despite an out-of-state divorce. In Simons v. Miami Beach 
First Nat'l Bank,74 the Court held that a Florida divorce terminated the 
dower right, in accordance with Florida law, of a New York domiciliary who 
had not appeared in the Florida action. All the Justices except Mr. Justice 
Harlan denied that the case repudiated the Vanderbilt approach. They 
pointed out that Florida, and not New York, had undertaken to provide 
dower and that the support payment ordered by the New York court had, 
in this case, faithfully been paid during the life of the former husband. To 
be sure, this is true. One could have supposed, however, that the division in 
divisible divorce was one separating economic rights for which full faith and 
credit would not be required, unless in personam jurisdiction had been ob­
tained over both spouses and status considerations which could be altered 
by a foreign court with in personam jurisdiction over only one. Carrying 
such a dichotomy to its conclusion, the Florida court would have been 
without power to change the wife's economic right-her right to dower. 
So long as New York law, by its perversity, makes migratory divorce com­
mon, any assault on Vanderbilt poses a threat to basic New York interests. 
If postmarital economics are complicated and occasionally unjust, at 
least the Legislature has seen fit to remove actions for restitution of gifts 
given in contemplation of marriage from the interdiction of the anti-heart 
balm legislation; consequently, one can hope that premarital finances will 
be equitably adjusted.75 Other economic changes of importance altered as­
pects of a surviving spouse's right of election,76 relieved persons of the obli­
gation to support grandchildren who are recipients of welfare assistance,77 
and gave illegitimate children considerably greater rights of inheritance.78 
v 
THE FAMILY COURT ACT 
In no field of law is the gulf between normative assumptions underly­
ing law and conduct any greater than in family law. As a result, when not 
bound by precedent, courts are free to come to entirely different conclusions 
72. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 46 Misc. 2d 693, 260 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. T., 1st Dep't 
1965). 
73. 354 U.S. 416 (1957). 
74. 381 U.S. 81 (1965). 
75. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 80·b (McKinney Supp. 1965). 
76. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 18·b (McKinney Supp. 1965). 
77. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 415. 
78. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 83·a (MCKinney Supp. 1965), and see text accompanying note 
59 supra. 
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by choosing to focus on either the stated norms or on well-known realities. 
Take, for example, the de facto family. It will startle no one that "there are 
countless households where man and woman reside with their offspring in a 
domestic relationship on a permanent basis without being legally married."79 
But how can a judge respond to such a relationship? On the one hand, with­
out any difficulty, he can point to the many instances in legislation and 
court decrees in which the public policy in favor of marriage and against 
"illicit" relationships is established. On that basis a judge may make a 
decision helping to bring about a termination of the irregular relationship. 
On the other hand, it is possible to view the problem with a recognition that 
the de facto family is probably both too useful and too well established to 
fall in the face of judicial bluster. 
Article 8 of the Family Court Act creates family offense proceedings 
which are designed to render help to families with internal strife. In legis­
lative contemplation, the procedure was essentially conciliatory in nature.80 
Does it apply to members of de facto families? In People v. Dugar, the court 
realistically stated: 
Such households are responsible for many of the most difficult social problems 
. . • .  They present behavior problems, support problems, mental and emotional 
problems. They concern the health, welfare and safety of children. They result 
in filiation proceedings, support proceedings and juvenile proceedings. In short, 
from a social point of view, this is a situation where the unique and flexible 
procedures and services available in the Family Court may possibly find a 
remedy.81 
This year a court thought differently: 
It is the public policy of this State not to place children in a situation which 
would impair their morals. . • . 
Assuming this court accepted jurisdiction, the most that we could do in order 
to help would be to effect a marital reconciliation, which is impossible in this 
situation. Actually, it would make the court a party, not only to an immoral 
relationship, but also, this court would be encouraging this relationship to 
continue. 
The conciliation procedures cannot be utilized in this situation where there 
is no marriage to begin with.82 
On the other hand, it would seem that once a marital knot is tied, it 
may remain tied for family offense proceedings purposes. In Koeppel v. 
Judges of Family Court,83 a former husband was unsuccessful in pleading his 
prior divorce as a bar to the invocation of family offense proceedings against 
him by his wife. Is the aim of the proceeding to reunite the former spouses? 
79. People v. Dugar, 37 Misc. 2d 652, 653, 235 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (Dist. Ct., Nassau 
Co. 1962). 
80. See N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 811. 
81. Supra note 79, at 653·54, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 153. 
82. Best v. Macklin, 46 Misc. 2d 622, 623, 260 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (Family Ct., Dutchess 
Co. 1965). 
83. 44 Mise. 2d 799, 254 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1964). 
